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1. Abstract 
This Master’s thesis concentrates on the geopolitics of the Arctic. The principal 
objectives are to identify the different international actors and their interests in the Arctic, 
thus revealing the possible issues that shall need to be addressed in the future. In the first 
parts of the paper, a theoretical framework for briefly explaining the concept of 
geopolitics is established, the Arctic is defined geographically (and politically) and the 
main international legal instruments pertaining to the region are explained, in order to set 
a framework for the scope of the rest of the thesis as well as the international action in the 
region. Following these sections, the agendas of different international actors are studied, 
so as to establish their official positions. The final section examines the three major 
factors concerning the Arctic’s future: natural resources, maritime routes and 
environmental protection.  
 
 
Resumen 
El presente Trabajo Fin de Máster versa sobre la geopolítica del Ártico. Los 
objetivos principales de este trabajo son identificar los diferentes actores internacionales 
y sus intereses en el Ártico, señalando así las posibles cuestiones que deberán ser 
abordados en el futuro. En la primera parte del trabajo se establece un marco teórico para 
explicar brevemente de qué se trata la geopolítica, el Ártico es definido tanto geográfica 
como políticamente y los principales instrumentos legales vigentes en la región son 
examinados, para fijar tanto el alcance del resto del trabajo como el de la acción 
internacional en el Ártico. A continuación, las agendas de los diferentes actores 
internacionales son estudiados para establecer sus posturas oficiales. La sección final del 
trabajo examina los tres principales factores en relación al futuro del Ártico: los recursos 
naturales, las rutas marítimas y la protección ambiental.  
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4. Methodology 
The Methodology for the realization of this work has been entirely bibliographic, 
using primary and secondary sources. These sources have been varied, in order to gain 
enough information: books, articles, websites and official institutional publications have 
all been used in the course of making this paper. The majority of the referenced works 
have been retrieved online, mainly in English, but also in Finnish, Spanish and French.  
Almost all the referenced documents are relatively recent, due to the orientation 
towards the present and future of this paper. Nevertheless, the necessary historical aspects 
and documents have been taken into account.  
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5. Introduction 
Lately the Arctic has gained a lot of attention and importance globally. This is 
mostly due to the changing conditions caused by climate change, and the potential and 
possibilities that are opening up with it.  
Historically the Arctic has had a secondary status, instead of being valued for itself. 
For example, during the Cold War it was used for its strategic location, since it provided 
a short route for missiles and submarines. Another factor to this historical underestimation 
was the orientation of the circumpolar countries’ policies. None of them was truly 
oriented towards the Arctic region, as they are today. For example, Sweden concentrated 
mainly on the Baltic area, Finland needed to remain rather neutral on everything due to 
the neighboring Soviet Union, whereas the Soviets concentrated on maintaining their 
empire and relations with the Warsaw Pact countries, Canada defined its economic and 
security policies mainly through the relation with the US, and the US in turn worried 
chiefly about the East-West tensions in international politics.1  
At the beginning of the 21st century, there are currently two lines of discourse in 
relation to the Arctic: the mainstream discourse that considers the Arctic to be a stable 
and peaceful area with no armed conflicts on sight, and the minority view that regards the 
Arctic as a potential race for natural resources and a possible escalation towards an armed 
conflict.2 It is possible that the fact that the Arctic Five were all trying to define their 
continental shelves by the deadline of 2009 created this impression of an Arctic race.3 
Nevertheless, there are three good reasons for not to talk about a race for the Arctic: first, 
there is only one overlapping terrestrial sovereignty claim: Hans Island. Second, the 
Arctic states have agreed that all marine disputes will be settled by according to 
international law of the sea. And lastly, all currently accessible natural resources are found 
within state jurisdictions.4  
Climate change and the melting sea ice are creating a wide range of opportunities 
in the region, and none of the countries want to miss out on it. For example, it seems that 
it is no longer a matter of if, but when the maritime routes shall open up for commercial 
                                                 
1 Vid. Mychajlyszyn, N. (2008, Oct 24). The Arctic: Geopolitical Issues.  
2 Vid. Heininen, L. (2011). Post-Cold War Arctic Geopolitics: Where Are the Peoples and the Environment? 
Arctic Perspectives Cahier (2), 89-103, p. 91 
3 Vid. Dodds, K. (2010, Oct). A Polar Mediterranean? Accessibility, Resources and Sovereignty in the 
Arctic Ocean. Global Policy, 1(3), 303-311, p. 303 
4 Vid. Kuersten, A. (2015, Aug 20). The Arctic Race that Wasn't. Foreign Affairs. 
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use and the access to and exploitation of natural resources become viable.5 Apart from 
these two major sectors, the Arctic has a lot of potential for hydropower and geothermal 
energy development, and great conditions for installing data storage centers or underwater 
telecommunications cables.6 
Due to the combination of a great variety of factors, the Arctic has gained a lot of 
global attention and interest. Not only have the Arctic Countries published official Arctic 
Strategies, but other actors such as international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations and non-Arctic states have also expressed their interest towards the region 
and what it may be able to offer in the future. In order to address these matters, a 
geopolitical approach towards studying the Arctic seems to be the most appropriate one, 
with the objective of identifying the principal Arctic actors and their strategies, through 
which the main challenges and prospects for the Arctic region can be discerned.  
  
                                                 
5 Vid. Borgerson, S. G. (2008). Arctic Meltdown. Foreign Affairs(March/April). 
6 Vid. Borgerson, S. G. (2013). The Coming Arctic Boom. Foreign Affairs(July/August) 
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6. Theoretical Framework for Geopolitics 
6.1. The Concept of Geopolitics 
There is no single right definition for geopolitics. There are many different 
understandings of what it entails, but in general terms, geopolitics is the study of how 
physical and human geography influence politics and international relations. 
Geographical conditions (human-made or natural, including for example natural 
resources and geological formations) form the scenario in which a state must operate, 
thus guiding and in large measure controlling, but not determining, the decisions 
made by humans.7 Geopolitics doesn’t pretend to predict future events, analyze 
foreign policies or state behaviors,8 but rather to see what role geography plays in the 
world’s (current) power structure. Almost always the physical geography can either 
be considered a benefit or a hindrance for the economic and political development of 
the states.9   
The term was first coined by the Swedish Rudolf Kjellén, who defined it as 
“the science of states as life forms, based on demographic, economic, political, social 
and geographical factors”.10 According to Friedrich Ratzel, who also considered 
states as growing organisms, the states derived their national power and capacity to 
survive in the international arena from the territory they controlled.11 Even in its first 
definition, the term included more than just physical conditions of a state, creating a 
concept that has been fluctuating throughout its existence. Yet there was a time it 
wasn’t used in a positive sense because it had been too deeply linked with the Nazi 
Germany’s concepts of Geopolitik and lebensraum (living space), especially 
promoted by the geographer Karl Haushofer, and used to justify the Nazis’ 
expansionist ideas.12 After the second world war, the term began progressively to 
make a comeback.  
                                                 
7 Vid. Scholvin, S. (2016, April). Geopolitics: An Overview of Concepts and Empirical Examples from 
International Relations., p. 13 
8 Vid. Ibid., p. 13;24 
9 Vid. Briney, A. (n.d.). Overview of Political Geography.  
10 Scholvin, S. (2016, April). Geopolitics: An Overview…, op. cit., p. 8 
11 Vid. Ibid., p. 8 
12 Vid. Ibid., p. 8 
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Alfred Mahan published The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–
1783 in 1890, where he displayed the “effect of sea power upon the course of history 
and the prosperity of nations”.13 According to Mahan, the control of the sea through 
maritime commerce and naval supremacy implied a predominant influence in the 
world, ergo making sea power essential to the prosperity of nations.14 Mahan 
enumerated six different factors that affect a nation’s sea power: geographical 
position, physical conformation, extent of territory, number of population, national 
character, and character and policy of governments.15  
Another relevant geopolitical theory was formulated at the beginning of the 
20th century by Harold Mackinder: the so-called Heartland theory (or Geographical 
Pivot of History). According to this theory, whoever ruled the Heartland (interior and 
northern part of Euro-Asia),16 would dominate the world. Mackinder based his idea 
on the geographical conditions of the region: it is protected by “ice-clad Polar Sea, 
forested and rugged Lenaland, and Central Asiatic mountain and arid tableland”,17 
leaving only the western front unprotected, yet easy to defend.18  
These two basically opposing theories concerning ruling the world show how 
the physical geographical factors cannot be the only factors considered when defining 
states’ prosperity and development. Mahan’s theory could have still been rather valid, 
if the international community hadn’t created a more or less functional legal 
framework for the world’s maritime areas, and in general hadn’t become immensely 
more cooperative than before. In turn, the failure of Mackinder’s theory resides in his 
belief of the Heartland area’s richness in natural resources and the railroad 
transportation’s success over the maritime one. However, technological advances and 
time proved both of Mackinder’s assumptions to have been inadequate.19  
As evidenced by the different theories and interpretations, geopolitics is a 
dynamic discipline that feeds off of the global political and strategic developments. 
                                                 
13 Mahan, A. T. (1890). The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. Preface. 
14 Vid. Giok, K. K. (2015). Sea Power as a Strategic Domain. Pointer, 41(3). p. 2 
15 Vid. Mahan, A. T. (1890). The Influence of …, op. cit., Chapter I. 
16 Vid. Mackinder, H. J. (1942). Democratic Ideals and Reality. London: Constable Publishers. p. 197 
17 Ibid., p. 203 
18 Vid. Ibid., p.  199 
19 Vid. Scholvin, S. (2016, April). Geopolitics: An Overview…, op. cit., p. 15 
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Today’s geopolitics still stresses the importance of anthropogeographical conditions 
and intervening variables, which can be seen reflected for example in the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary’s definition of geopolitics as “a study of the influence of such 
factors as geography, economics, and demography on the politics and especially the 
foreign policy of a state”.20 Colin Gray, an expert on Strategic Studies, has even 
suggested that all politics is actually geopolitics, since all politics always works 
within a particular geographical context.21 
 
6.2. Difference between Geopolitics and Political Geography 
As stated in the previous chapter, geopolitics studies the influence of 
geographical conditions (again, human-made or natural) in international relations. In 
contrast, political geography studies the spatial production of a political order, i.e. 
how do political decisions and ideals influence the physical geographical space. 
Political geography analyzes past events, it is to say, political decisions already in 
force, instead of concentrating what might happen in the future. This makes it a static 
discipline, in contrast to the dynamic geopolitics.22  
For Y. Lacoste, a famous French geographer, geography was “a form of 
strategic and political knowledge, central to military strategy and the exercise of 
political power”.23 Lacoste considered geography to be political-strategic knowledge, 
indispensable for a state to control and organize its population and territory, as well 
as for warfare.24 He argues that mapping was first invented for military uses, with 
certain political and scientific dominion over the represented territory and as an 
instrument of power over the people of the area.25 Lacoste’s ideas further underline 
the fact that political geography was used to interpret the existing power relations 
over the territory and studying the implications of political strategies regarding it. 
                                                 
20 Merriam-Webster Dictionary. 
21 Vid. Mayer, M. (n.d.). What is geopolitics? 
22 Vid. Jain, M. (2014, Sep 2).  Geopolitics: Fundamentals of Geography. 
23 Hepple, L. W. (2000). Géopolitiques de Gauche. Yves Lacoste, Hérodote and French radical. In K. 
Dodds, & D. Atkinson, Geopolitical traditions. A century of geopolitical thought (pp. 268-301). New York: 
Routledge. p. 268 
24 Vid. Lacoste, Y. (1976). Geografía: un Arma para la Guerra. p. 6 
25 Vid. Ibid., 7 
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Currently some of the main areas of investigation of political geography are 
“the mapping and study of elections and their results, the relationship between the 
government at the federal, state and local level and its people, the marking of political 
boundaries, and the relationships between nations involved in international 
supranational political groupings”.26  
                                                 
26 Briney, A. (n.d.). Overview of Political Geography.  
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7. What is the Arctic? 
7.1. Geographic delimitation 
The Arctic has many different definitions, as can be evidenced by figure 1, 
usually applied according to the interests for which they shall be used. Perhaps the 
most widely accepted one for the geographic delimitation of the Arctic region is the 
Arctic Circle.27 By this definition, applied also in the Arctic Council (AC), “the Arctic 
includes all areas north of the Arctic Circle and the associated eight Arctic states, i.e. 
Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, the United States 
and Sweden”.28  
 
Figure 1. Geographical delimitations of the Arctic region29 
 
                                                 
27 Vid. Prime Minister's Office. (2013, Sep 6). Suomen Arktinen Strategia 2013. Finland. p. 8 
28 Sweden's Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2011, Oct). Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region. Sweden. p. 
11 
29 Encyclopedia Britannica Kids. (2010). Arctic Regions. 
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As for other definitions, they can include the areas north of the 10ºC isotherm 
for July30 (also visible in figure 1.) or the limitation by the Arctic Ocean extending 
up to 80º latitude.31 Some Arctic States define the region differently so as to promote 
their interests: for example, according to the Russian Arctic strategy, the region 
includes the Arctic Ocean and its littoral states.32 Another example would be 
Iceland’s definition: due to its interests of establishing itself as an Arctic coastal state, 
it prefers to use a broader definition by stating that the Arctic region extends not only 
to the North Pole area but also to the Northern Atlantic Ocean.33  
On the other hand, Norway seems to prefer to use the term High North instead 
of the Arctic in its strategy. Nevertheless, the strategy remarks that “the High North 
is not precisely defined” and that it includes “the Arctic and the wider circumpolar 
area, and internationally the terms “High North” and “the Arctic” are frequently used 
interchangeably”. It also states that “in political terms, it includes the administrative 
entities in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia that are part of the Barents 
Cooperation”.34  
Regardless of these specifications by some of the Arctic States, the fact that all 
of them are members of the Arctic Council goes to show that they all accept the 
conventional definition of the Arctic Circle.  
 
7.2. Legal Framework 
The general consensus states that the Arctic is a stable and peaceful region. 
Even though there is no overarching treaty on the Arctic,35 such as the Antarctic 
Treaty (1959) for the other pole region, there are several documents that form a legal 
framework for the area. Without a doubt, the most important one is the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Some other important 
regulating documents related to the Arctic are the Ilulissat Declaration (2008), the 
                                                 
30 Vid. Foucher, M. (2014). L'Arctique: la nouvelle frontière. Paris: CNRS Éditions. p. 10 
31 Vid. Albert Ferrero, J. (2011, Nov). Incidencia del Deshielo en la Geopolítica del Ártico. Revista General 
de Marina, 681-690. p. 682 
32 Vid. Heininen, L. (2012). State of the Arctic Strategies and Policies – A Summary. Arctic Yearbook. p. 
20 
33 Vid. Althingi. (2011, Mar 28). A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy. p. 1 
34 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009, Apr 7). New Building Blocks in the North. Norway. p. 7 
35 Vid. Borgerson, S. G. (2008). Arctic…, op.cit. 
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International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Polar Code (2014) and the Arctic 
Council’s various Declarations (although the Arctic Council is a high-level forum of 
cooperation instead of a formal international organization and thus doesn’t usually 
generate legally binding obligations to its member states, it is considered to be the 
highest form of cooperation in the region and due to this also a regulating institution).  
The issue of the Arctic governance is caused by the different interests and goals 
of the different states. The Arctic countries wish to continue exercising their rule of 
the area exclusively, whereas other states see the Arctic more as a common heritage 
of mankind, same as the Antarctic.36 A part of the discussion concentrates on the legal 
instruments regulating the Arctic, and whether to create new ones (e.g. an 
International Treaty on the Arctic, similar to the Antarctic Treaty37) or empower the 
old ones (such as transforming the Arctic Council into a formal international 
organization).  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed in 1982 in 
Montego Bay, Jamaica and it became effective in 1994. It regulates the states’ rights 
and responsibilities regarding the marine areas of the world. The Convention has 17 
parts, each divided into sections and subsections. For the purposes of this work, the 
most important parts include: straits used for international navigation (part III); 
exclusive economic zone (part V); continental shelf (part VI); protection and 
preservation of the marine environment (part XII); and settlement of disputes (part 
XV).38  
The Convention establishes the limits for the states’ marine jurisdiction for the 
territorial waters, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as well as for the continental 
shelf limits. However, sometimes establishing these limitations can be problematic, 
as can be seen in figure 2, due mostly to geographical factors or the different 
interpretations of the regulations set forth in UNCLOS.  
                                                 
36 Vid. Ebinger, C. K., & Zambetakis, E. (2009, Nov). The geopolitics of Arctic Melt. International Affairs, 
85(6), p. 1223 
37 The Antarctic Treaty establishes the Antarctic continent as a scientific preserve, with freedom of 
scientific investigation and cooperation, banning all future territorial sovereignty claims as well as military 
activity on the continent. (Vid. United Nations. (1959). The Antarctic Treaty.) 
38 Vid. United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. p. 8-20 
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Figure 2. Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region39 
                                                 
39 IBRU: The Centre for Borders Research at Durham University. (2015, Aug 4). Maritime jurisdiction and 
boundaries in the Arctic region. 
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In article 76, UNCLOS defines the continental shelf of a coastal state as “the 
natural prolongation of its land territory”40 until the limit of 200 nautical miles. The 
coastal states have the possibility to claim more continental shelf (with a maximum 
distance from the baseline up to 350 nautical miles), in accordance to article 76, 
through the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in a ten-year 
time period since the entry into force for the state in question. There has however 
been some criticism towards this particular article: the language used is allegedly too 
ambiguous; interstate cooperation can be complicated since the submissions under 
the article aren’t available for other states to challenge; and the deadlines for 
submitting their claims are different for each state.41  
In articles 55 and 57, respectively, UNCLOS defines the EEZ as “an area 
beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea”42 that “shall not extend beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured”.43 
The EEZ have caused some overlapping claims mostly due to their demarcation of 
the states’ continental shelves44 when the distance between two states’ coastal lines 
hasn’t been wide enough to establish a 200 nautical mile EEZ for each.  
The Ilulissat Declaration was issued in 2008 as a result of a meeting by the 
Arctic Five (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, USA). The Declaration underlines 
the impacts the melting ice cap and climate change related alterations in the Arctic 
may produce in the vulnerable ecosystems, livelihoods of local inhabitants and 
indigenous communities and also the potential exploitation of the natural resources. 
The document also reasserts the Arctic Five’s commitment to respecting the law of 
the sea (it does not specifically mention UNCLOS, since the US is not a party, thus 
referring to customary international law, which is applicable to all states),45 considers 
it to provide a solid foundation for the governance of the Arctic Ocean, and thus see 
no reason to develop a new overarching treaty for the region.  
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 53 
41 Vid. Ebinger, C. K., & Zambetakis, E. (2009, Nov). The geopolitics of Arctic…, op. cit., p. 1225-1226). 
42 United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention…, op. cit., p. 43 
43 Ibid., p. 44 
44 Vid. Heininen, L. (2011). Post-Cold War Arctic…, op. cit., p. 91 
45 Vid. Dodds, K. (2010, Oct). A Polar Mediterranean?..., op. cit., p. 308 
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The Ilulissat Declaration seems to convey a message to other states wishing to 
take part in the Arctic region:46 the Arctic Five reassert their predominant role in the 
region’s governance by stating at the beginning of the document that “by virtue of 
their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean 
the five coastal states are in a unique position to address these possibilities and 
challenges”.47 Later on, the Arctic Five’s inherent right to be on the forefront of the 
Arctic politics is remarked anew: “the Arctic Ocean is a unique ecosystem, which the 
five coastal states have a stewardship role in protecting”.48 This point of view raises 
a question on how much other Arctic states or non-Arctic states shall be able to 
influence the region’s future.49 This question remains yet to be answered, but can be 
oriented to some extent by observing the positions the five Arctic states will assume 
in the future.  
When it comes to international cooperation, the Ilulissat Declaration considers 
it to be a key factor in the Arctic. The littoral states commit themselves to take the 
necessary steps, both nationally and in cooperation, in order to protect the 
environment, reduce vessel-based pollution and add safety to shipping (also through 
IMO). Additionally, contributing to the Arctic Council’s work and cooperating in 
scientific research and exchange of information are heeded.  
Proof of the current legal regime’s effectiveness can actually be found directly 
in the overlapping sovereignty claims. In 2009, there were several active disputes: 
Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges amid Canada, Russia and Denmark; Bering Strait 
and Chukchi Sea between Russia and USA; Beaufort Sea between USA and Canada; 
Hans Island between Canada and Denmark (the only dispute over dry land); Barents 
Sea between Norway and Russia;50 and Lincoln Sea between Canada and Denmark.51 
To these days, only three disputes still linger: Lincoln Sea, Beaufort Sea and Hans 
Island. The rest of them have all been resolved in an amicable and cooperative 
manner, according to international law.  
                                                 
46 Vid. Yeager, B. B. (2008). The Ilulissat Declaration: background and implications for arctic governance. 
47 The Ilulissat Declaration. (2008, May 28). p. 1 
48 Ibid., p. 2 
49 Vid. Yeager, B. B. (2008). The Ilulissat Declaration: background…, op.cit. 
50 Vid. Ebinger, C. K., & Zambetakis, E. (2009, Nov). The geopolitics of Arctic…, op. cit., p. 1228-1229 
51 Vid. Albert Ferrero, J. (2011, Nov). Incidencia del Deshielo…, op. cit., p. 683-684). 
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8. International Actors in the Arctic 
8.1. Arctic Countries: National Strategies and State Policies 
All of the eight Arctic States published an official National Strategy or State 
Policy between 2007 and 2011 and some of these states, e.g. Norway or Finland, have 
already considered it appropriate to update their strategies. Each of these documents 
states the priorities and objectives of the state in question, and some lists are quite a 
bit more extensive than others. In general, all the documents respond to the changing 
environmental conditions that the Arctic region has been and is going through, in 
addition to the geopolitical shift in the region, i.e. the growing global interest towards 
the Arctic, regarding especially the promising shipping and energy related prospects. 
In order to understand what the priority areas for each state are, a short 
summary and some analytical comments on the strategies are necessary. The 
strategies will be presented and dealt with in alphabetical order. At the end of the 
section short comparative conclusions shall be drawn regarding the similarities and 
disparities of the documents. 
 
8.1.1. Canada 
The Canadian Government issued their Northern Strategy Our North, Our 
Heritage, Our Future in 2009, which was followed by the Statement on Canada’s 
Arctic Foreign Policy in 2010. Both documents emphasize the North being a 
fundamental factor to Canada’s national identity, thus justifying the Canadian 
interests in the region. Basically the two documents underline four main priority 
areas, in the same order: exercising Arctic sovereignty, promoting social and 
economic development, protecting the environmental heritage of the Arctic and 
improving and devolving northern governance.52  
Regarding exercising the sovereignty, it is said that Canada will keep on 
managing the few existing boundary issues (considered to pose no threat to the 
country’s sovereignty) and “may seek to resolve them in the future, in accordance 
with international law”.53  
                                                 
52 Vid. Government of Canada. (2009). Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our 
Future.; also Vid. Government of Canada. (2010). Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy. 
53 Government of Canada. (2010). Statement on Canada's…, op. cit., p. 13 
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The priority area concerning social and economic development emphasizes 
the sustainable use of the Arctic potential and that the beneficiaries will be the 
Northerners. The main goal is to “build self-sufficient, vibrant and healthy 
Northern communities”.54  
The chapter on environmental protection seeks first and foremost to 
safeguard the fragile and unique northern ecosystems and environment, adversely 
affected by climate change, for future generations. Also the importance of science 
and scientific research on Arctic matters is highlighted, as well as being a global 
leader in Arctic sciences.  
As for the priority of improving and devolving northern governance, it 
concentrates on engaging the Northerners in the decision making processes and in 
general giving them a greater say in the issues that affect them.  
 
8.1.2. The Kingdom of Denmark 
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 was launched in 
2011 and adopted by the Governments of Denmark, the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland, where “the aim is to strengthen the Kingdom’s status as global player 
in the Arctic”.55 The strategy states that all three parts of the Kingdom will work 
for “a peaceful, secure and safe Arctic, with self-sustaining growth and 
development, with respect for the Arctic’s fragile climate, environment and 
nature, in close cooperation with our international partners”.56 These priorities 
have their corresponding titles in the strategy’s sections. Even though the strategy 
doesn’t have a specific section on empowering the peoples of the North, the 
introduction clearly manifests that the “strategy for the Arctic region is first and 
foremost a strategy for a development that benefits the inhabitants of the Arctic”.57  
Regarding a peaceful, secure and safe Arctic, the maritime safety, 
surveillance and exercising of sovereignty are all emphasized, as well as 
UNCLOS as a part of the basis for a peaceful cooperation in the Arctic. It is 
                                                 
54 Ibid., p. 14 
55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2011, Aug). Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-
2020. p. 11 
56 Ibid., p. 11 
57 Ibid., p. 10 
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explicitly stated that “the Arctic is not a legal vacuum”58, as the UNCLOS 
provides a legal framework for the region, for example in navigational rights or 
resource management. 
The section on self-sustaining growth and development concentrates on the 
sustainable exploitation of different resources, such as minerals, oil activities, 
living resources or renewable energy potential. Also scientific research on Arctic 
matters is highlighted.  
When it comes to the environmental protection, knowledge building and 
management based on the best scientific knowledge available is underlined. Better 
understanding of the consequences of climate change and protecting the 
environment and biodiversity are also high on the list of priorities.  
The last section deals with international cooperation and advocates for it on 
three different levels, corresponding to a different scenario of challenges: global, 
regional and bilateral. Concerning global level, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) are 
promoted as a response for the issues generated by climate change and the IMO 
in regard to maritime safety and international shipping matters.  
On regional level the Arctic Council is considered to be the primary organ 
for Arctic cooperation and concrete actions, concerning issues such as sustainable 
development and the indigenous peoples’ living conditions. Other regional 
entities are also mentioned: the Arctic Five format is cited regarding the 
continental shelf issue, the European Union (EU) in terms of its interest towards 
transportation and natural resources, and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Nordic Atlantic Cooperation 
(NORA) and West Nordic Cooperation are referred to concerning their respective 
sectorial interests.  
The third level consists of bilateral cooperation, of even more concrete and 
specific actions, where the other Arctic countries are considered as primary 
partners, dealing with same matters as the global level, but also with more 
emphasis on research, education, health and defense. In addition, some Asian 
countries (China, Japan and South Korea) are highlighted regarding their interests 
                                                 
58 Ibid., p. 13 
Geopolitics of the Arctic: Challenges and Prospects 
21 
 
on climate change research, transportation opportunities and natural resource 
exploitation. 
 
8.1.3. Finland 
Finland’s Arctic Strategy was issued in 2010, and an updated strategy was 
issued in 2013. In general, both strategies cover the same issues, but the 2013 
strategy seems to put even more emphasis on economic development. 
The 2010 strategy has six main sections: fragile Arctic nature; economic 
activities and know-how; transport and infrastructure; indigenous peoples; 
international cooperation; and the EU in the Arctic.59 None of these sections seem 
to be given more importance than the others, thus reflecting a rather holistic 
approach on the Arctic, but based on the text itself L. Heininen60 considers the 
main focus to be on economic interests, specifically marine transport, 
infrastructure and know-how.  
In turn, the 2013 updated strategy has five main categories: Finland’s Arctic 
population; education and research; Arctic economic activities; environment and 
stability; and international cooperation. The strategy is said to be set on four 
pillars: Arctic Country; Arctic Expertise; Sustainable Development and 
Environmental Boundary Conditions; and International Cooperation.61 The 
section dealing with economic activities can be perceived as the main focal point 
(since it is clearly more extensive than the others), as it was in the 2010 strategy. 
This is due to the fact that the business opportunities the Arctic region can offer 
in the future are deemed to be extremely important for Finland’s economy, both 
the public and private sectors. 
Finland strives to be a national as well as an international advocate for the 
sustainable development and a promoter of stability. The Finnish expertise and 
know-how is also greatly emphasized in areas such as Arctic shipbuilding, 
offshore technology, winter navigation, oil spill control and clean technology. In 
order to protect the balance of the Arctic’s nature and create an ecologically 
sustainable economy and social development, the strategy considers combining 
                                                 
59 Vid. Prime Minister's Office. (2010, Jun 7). Suomen Arktinen Strategia. Finland. 
60 Vid. Heininen, L. (2011). Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study. p. 26 
61 Vid. Prime Minister's Office. (2013, Sep 6). Suomen Arktinen…, op. cit., p. 7 
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the modern industrial utilization of natural resources and the traditional 
livelihoods to be very important. 
Regarding international cooperation, Finland considers the Arctic Council 
to be the primary forum of Arctic cooperation and will keep contributing to its 
labor. Finland supports its transformation into a formal international organization 
through a legally binding treaty, and dismisses the Arctic Five meetings by stating 
that it is very important for Finland that the Arctic Council preserve its central 
position.  
 
8.1.4. Iceland 
The report concerning Iceland’s status in the Arctic, Ísland á norðurslóðum 
(Iceland in the High North), was published in 2009 by the country’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and two years later, in 2011, A Parliamentary Resolution on 
Iceland's Arctic Policy was approved by Althingi, the Icelandic Parliament.  
The report is divided into the following six sections: multilateral 
cooperation, security and defense, natural resources and environmental protection, 
transportation, culture and people, and research and monitoring. In addition to 
these areas, the resolution lists some other principles for the Icelandic Arctic 
policy (twelve in total), such as promoting and strengthening the Arctic Council 
as the primary forum of the region, securing Iceland’s position as a coastal state 
of the Arctic region, protecting indigenous peoples’ rights and resolving 
differences through UNCLOS. These same priorities can also be seen reflected in 
the report made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2010,62 as well as Iceland’s 
firm opposition towards the Arctic Five meetings.   
Iceland promotes itself as the only country that is entirely located in the 
Arctic63 and stresses the importance of multilateral cooperation especially within 
the Arctic Eight (the member states of the AC) and Iceland’s neighboring 
countries Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The co-operational aspect is 
highlighted also in the context of transportation of oil and gas through Icelandic 
waters and the response measures in case of accidents or environmental 
                                                 
62 Vid. Skarphédinsson, Ö. (2010, May 14). Iceland's interests and a responsible foreign policy. 
63 Even though Iceland reiterates to be the only country located entirely in the Arctic (which would make 
its coastline Arctic), it hasn’t been invited to the Arctic Five meetings (exclusively for the five coastal 
states), and many times it isn’t listed at all as an Arctic coastal state in the media or academic works. 
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emergencies. The fight against climate change and the protection of the Arctic’s 
fragile environment and ecosystems are underlined also when it comes to resource 
development and exploitation, which should be conducted in a sustainable 
manner.  
 
8.1.5. Norway 
The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy was issued in 2007 by 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the follow-up strategy New 
Building Blocks in the North was issued in 2009. The 2007 strategy states its 
overall goal to be creating “sustainable growth and development in the High 
North”.64 The overall goal doesn’t change in the newer strategy, as it is said to be 
“to enhance knowledge in and about the north, increase our activity and presence 
in the area and lay the foundations for sustainable economic and social 
development in the years to come”.65  
The 2007 strategy lists five main objectives: continue building good 
relations with Russia; continue combating illegal fishing and managing the fish 
resources; benefit from the Barents Sea energy resources in a sustainable manner; 
consider environmental and climate aspects in every action; and improve living 
conditions of northern inhabitants and safeguard indigenous peoples’ rights.  
The strategies share the same seven main political priority areas, which are: 
exercising authority in the High North in a credible, consistent and predictable 
way; being at the forefront of international efforts to develop knowledge in and 
about the High North; being the best steward of the environment and natural 
resources in the High North; providing a suitable framework for further 
development of petroleum activities in the Barents Sea, seeking to boost and foster 
local and regional business development; safeguarding the livelihoods, traditions 
and cultures of indigenous peoples in the High North; further developing people-
to-people cooperation in the High North; and strengthening cooperation with 
Russia. 
                                                 
64 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2007, Feb 21). The Norwegian Government's Strategy for the 
High North. Norway. p. 7 
65 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2009, Apr 7). New Building Blocks…, op. cit., p. 3 
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Norway’s focus on both the strategies is rather local, since the main areas 
seem to be the Barents Sea and bilateral cooperation with Russia instead of the 
entire Arctic region. Indeed, the strategies have a quite strong focus on the well-
functioning co-operative relationship with Russia and the importance of 
maintaining and improving this particular relationship. Other international or 
regional cooperation is not emphasized nearly as much.  
 
8.1.6. The Russian Federation 
In 2009 the Russian Federation published its strategy for the Arctic region 
called The Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic 
in the Period up to 2020 and Beyond. The document is divided into four main 
chapters (plus a final chapter on the realization timeline): National interests; Basic 
objectives and strategic priorities; Measures of realization of the policy; and 
Mechanisms of realization of the policy.66  
As Russia’s national interests, four are listed: using the Russian Arctic as a 
strategic resource base in order to solve social and economic development 
problems; maintaining peace and cooperation in the Arctic; preserving the unique 
ecological systems of the Arctic; and using the Northern Sea Route for national 
transport.67  
The basic objectives of the policy include various spheres of action.  
Regarding social and economic development, for example, an expansion of the 
resource base is needed. In peace maintenance, having an operative regime with 
fighting potential is considered important. Also protecting the environment, 
sustaining international cooperation, promoting scientific research and forming an 
information area of the Russian Arctic are listed.68  
As for the strategic priorities, they include for example: improving the 
quality of life of the indigenous peoples; modernizing and developing the Arctic 
transportation infrastructure; strengthening regional cooperation; and delimiting 
the maritime spaces in the Arctic Ocean. The chapters on the measures and 
                                                 
66 Vid. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2009, Mar 30). Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic to 2020. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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mechanisms, as their titles indicate, pretend to provide solutions to the observed 
problems in each sphere.  
The last chapter deals with the time periods envisioned for the realization 
of the policy. The first stage (2008-2011) concentrates on the expansion of 
international cooperation (also in natural resource development), assuring a 
greater financial commitment from the government and working to delimit the 
Russian external Arctic border. The second stage (2011-2015) prioritizes the 
structural reorganization of Russia’s Arctic economy, the international legal 
recognition of its external Arctic border and infrastructural development for the 
maintenance of the Northern Sea Route. During the final stage (2016-2020) the 
Russian Arctic should be transformed into the planned strategic resource base.  
As so many interests (four), objectives (six) and priorities (ten) are included 
in the strategy, it is hard to say which are considered the most important ones and 
thus many different interpretations have come forth. For example, Viktor Basargin 
found three basic ideas of the document to be: creating a harmonized and common 
national Arctic policy; maintaining and strengthening Russian sovereignty and 
interests in the Arctic; and transforming the Russian society into a society of 
information and economy through the utilization of northern human capital 
potential.69 Another interpretation of the Arctic’s importance for Russia would be 
Nikita Lomagin’s three-point list: actively extracting natural resources; 
developing transport, telecommunications and border infrastructure; and turning 
the Arctic region into a strategic resource base.70 A third example of these various 
interpretations would be made by L. Heininen,71 by selecting a twofold approach: 
stabilizing the northernmost borders and thus guaranteeing a legal right for 
resource exploration; and bridging the socio-economic disparities gap that exists 
between the Arctic regions and the rest of the country, with special attention to 
indigenous peoples and sustainable development. The state policy itself only 
states that its realization is ultimately meant to “allow Russia to maintain the role 
of a leading Arctic power”.72  
                                                 
69 Vid. Heininen, L. (2011). Arctic Strategies and…, op. cit., p. 48 
70 Vid. Ibid., p. 48 
71 Vid. Ibid., p. 48 
72 Vid. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. (2009, Mar 30). Russian Federation Policy…, op. cit.  
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8.1.7. Sweden 
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region was issued in 2011 and it has a very 
focused approach with only four main areas of interest: international cooperation; 
climate and the environment; economic development; and the human dimension.73 
The document begins with factual explanations regarding the Arctic region and a 
small summary of all the other countries’ Arctic strategies (Sweden was the last 
of the Arctic Eight to launch its Arctic strategy) and then passes on to explaining 
all the reasons why Sweden is tied to the Arctic. The two remaining chapters 
reflect Sweden’s objectives in Arctic cooperation and its priorities. 
The multilateral Arctic cooperation per se is underlined as Sweden’s main 
objective and the strategy refers to many different bodies of cooperation, such as 
the Arctic Council (as the main form of cooperation on Arctic matters), the EU, 
the NCM, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the United Nations (with 
special mentions to UNCLOS, UNFCCC, CBD, UNEP), World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the Saami Parliamentary Council.74 In addition, there is 
an entry on the Arctic Five group and a statement saying that it is important for 
Finland, Sweden and Iceland to be able to participate in the decision-making 
processes, which can be achieved through the Arctic Council.75  
As for the priorities discussed in the strategy, the first main category is 
climate and the environment, which includes subcategories on climate, 
biodiversity, environmental protection and climate and environmental research. 
The second main category is economic development and it encompasses the areas 
of free trade in the Arctic, interests in the Barents region specifically as well as in 
the rest of the Arctic (such as mining, petroleum, forestry, land and maritime 
transport, infrastructure and energy) and educational and research needs.76 In this 
context sustainable development and Swedish know-how are promoted.77 The 
third and last of the main categories is the human dimension. This section focuses 
on how the geographical conditions of the Arctic affect people’s health, how 
climate change affects the population in general as well as the indigenous cultures 
                                                 
73 Sweden's Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2011, Oct). Sweden's Strategy…, op. cit. 
74 Vid. Ibid., p. 18-22 
75 Vid. Ibid., p. 22 
76 Vid. Ibid., p. 32-40 
77 Vid. Heininen, L. (2011). Arctic Strategies and…, op. cit., p. 51-52 
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and industries and also on the survival of the Saami languages and research 
programs on Saami society.  
 
8.1.8. The United States of America 
The US Government published the National Security Presidential 
Directive/NSPD-66 regarding “Arctic Region Policy”78 in January 2009 and then 
in May 2013 it issued its National Strategy for the Arctic Region.79 In comparison 
to the other Arctic Strategies, the American documents are much shorter, 14 and 
13 pages, respectively. 
The 2009 directive states six different goals of the policy: national and 
homeland security; environmental protection and conservation; sustainable 
economic development and resource management; strengthening of the Arctic 
Eight cooperation; involving the indigenous communities in the decision-making 
processes; and promoting scientific monitoring and research of environmental 
issues.  
After stating the policy goals, the directive goes into more detail concerning 
these goals and some other issues. However, the indigenous communities don’t 
get a specific section nor any more attention in the rest of the document. For 
example, preventing terrorism and freedom of the seas (in the context of the 
Northwest Passage) are underlined as a national and homeland security interest. 
Regarding governance, an Arctic Treaty is deemed “not appropriate or 
necessary”,80 but the ratification of UNCLOS is promoted, since it is thought of 
as “the most effective way to achieve international recognition and legal 
certainty”81 for the extended continental shelf and pending boundary issues (in the 
Beaufort Sea, with Canada). In the sphere of international cooperation, the Arctic 
Council is praised for positive results in sustainable development and at the same 
time the US remarks its preference for it to continue as a high-level forum instead 
of becoming a formal international organization.  
                                                 
78 The White House. (2009, Jan 9). National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-66. Office of the Press 
Secretary. 
79 The White House. (2010, May). National Strategy for the Arctic Region. 
80 The White House. (2009, Jan 9). National Security…, op. cit., p. 5 
81 Ibid., 6 
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As for the 2013 Arctic Strategy, it begins by establishing three lines of 
effort: advancing the US interests in the Arctic; pursuing responsible stewardship 
of the region; and strengthening international cooperation. Also four guiding 
principles for the US action in the Arctic are established: safeguarding peace and 
stability; decision-making based on the best available information; pursuit of 
innovative arrangements; and consultation and coordination with Alaska Natives.  
The first line of effort, advancing the US interests, includes such goals as 
developing Arctic infrastructure and strategic capabilities, preserving the freedom 
of the seas and providing for future energy security. The second line of effort, 
regarding responsible stewardship, underlines for example environmental 
protection and conservation, cultural values, balancing of economic development, 
and increasing understanding of the Arctic region through scientific research. The 
last line of effort deals with strengthening international cooperation through four 
objectives: pursuit of shared Arctic state prosperity, environmental protection and 
security; working through the Arctic Council to advance US interests; ratification 
of UNCLOS; and cooperation with other interested parties.82  
 
8.1.9. Some Comparative Remarks 
Many of the strategies can be seen as a response to the changing Arctic 
environment and the growing geopolitical interest towards the region. This is the 
case for the strategies of Canada, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and the US. On the 
other hand, the Russian strategy is oriented much more towards domestic politics, 
whereas the Norwegian strategy is very local and reflects basically only the 
country’s cooperative relationship with Russia in the Barents Sea region. The 
Danish strategy concentrates mainly on the self-governing status of Greenland and 
puts special emphasis on the Arctic Five cooperation.83  
Finland, Sweden and Iceland openly affirm to oppose the exclusive Arctic 
Five meetings, whereas the Danish strategy actually promotes it as “an essential 
complementary regional forum for the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean”.84  
                                                 
82 Vid. The White House. (2010, May). National Strategy…, op. cit., p. 9-10 
83 Vid. Heininen, L. (2011). Arctic Strategies and…, op. cit., p. 66; also Vid. Heininen, L. (2012). State of 
the Arctic…, op.cit., p. 3   
84 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2011, Aug). Kingdom of Denmark Strategy…, op. cit., p. 49 
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All of the Arctic states refer to themselves in their strategy in some way as 
Arctic actors or countries, as if to thus reassert their rightful interest towards the 
region. Canada defines itself as a Northern country; Denmark as a global player 
in the Arctic; Finland simply as an Arctic country; Iceland as the only country 
located entirely within the Arctic region; Norway as a steward of the natural and 
cultural heritage in the High North; Russia as a leading Arctic power; Sweden as 
an Arctic country (simple and same as Finland); and the US as an Arctic nation.  
 
8.2. Other actors  
8.2.1. Arctic Council 
The Arctic Council was founded in 1996 by Finnish initiative. It is an 
international forum of cooperation, considered the highest form of cooperation in 
the Arctic. Since it is not a formal international organization, generally it doesn’t 
create legally binding obligations for its members and therefore it would be better 
categorized as an instrument of soft law.  
The Arctic Council has eight members: Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Russia, USA and Sweden (the Arctic Countries or the Arctic 
Eight) and six permanent participants: Aleut International Association (AIA), 
Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich'in Council International (GCI), Inuit 
Circumpolar Council (ICC), Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the 
North, Siberia and Far East (RAIPON), and Saami Council (SC). In addition, the 
AC has approved twelve non-Arctic countries, nine intergovernmental and inter-
parliamentary organizations and eleven non-governmental organizations as 
observers.85  
The Council has established various working groups and launched many 
important publications. The working groups are: Arctic Contaminants Action 
Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), 
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response (EPPR), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 
(PAME) and Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).86  
                                                 
85 Vid. The Arctic Council website: About Us > Observers. <http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers> 
86 Vid. Ibid. 
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As for the publications, two legally binding agreements have been set forth: 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in 
the Arctic (signed in 2011) and Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil 
Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (signed in 2013). Other 
documents include for example: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA, 2005), 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA, 2009), Arctic Biodiversity 
Assessment (ABA, 2013) or Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (2009).87  
The Arctic Council’s mandate is to “improve the well-being of Arctic 
residents, protect the Arctic environment, and promote sustainable development 
throughout the region including maintaining the cultural heritage and livelihoods 
of Arctic indigenous peoples”.88 It does not address security issues, because upon 
its foundation the US intentionally prohibited this.89  
There has also been some criticism towards the Council’s status. Some 
deem it inefficient because it isn’t a formal international organization and it lacks 
a broader scope of issues, i.e. it focuses mostly on environmental matters, not for 
example on security. However, the opposing opinions consider leaving the 
security aspect out of the equation to be an advantage, since these issues are highly 
divisive and could impair other kind of collaboration as a side-effect.90 In any 
case, the AC needs to establish a regional order that supports the fragile balance 
between human progress and preservation of nature, as well as succeed in 
maintaining it.91  
 
8.2.2. European Union 
An Integrated European Union policy for the Arctic (2016) has three main 
areas of action: climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment; 
promoting sustainable development in the region; and supporting international 
cooperation on Arctic issues.92 Previous to the most recent format, the EU’s 
                                                 
87 Vid. Arctic Council. (2015, Apr). Arctic Marine Strategic Plan. p. 7 
88 Arctic Council website: The Arctic Council: a forum for peace and cooperation. < http://arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/415-20th-anniversary-statement> 
89 Vid. Borgerson, S. G. (2008). Arctic…, op.cit. 
90 Vid. Mychajlyszyn, N. (2008, Oct 24). The Arctic: Geopolitical…, op. cit.  
91 Vid. Liow, J. C. (2014, Jun 21). Arctic Summer. Foreign Affairs. 
92 Vid. European Commission. (2016, Apr 27). An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic., p. 4 
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publications referred to three main areas of action as knowledge, responsibility 
and engagement,93 but essentially they designated the same ideas.  
Furthermore, these same three concepts are still used today as key areas for 
future development of EU’s Arctic Policy, as follows: “supporting research and 
channeling knowledge to address environmental and climate change in the Arctic; 
acting responsibly to help ensure that economic development in the Arctic is 
based on sustainable use of resources and environmental expertise; and stepping 
up constructive engagement and dialogue with Arctic states, indigenous peoples 
and other partners”.94 
The policy gives clear priority to environmental protection and sustainable 
development, instead of promoting the development of the possible Arctic 
maritime routes or exploitation of the region’s natural resources. Also the 
importance of cooperation is highlighted, since the issues facing the Arctic require 
a joint response, regionally and globally.95 Research, science and innovation are 
promoted as being key players in all areas of action.96 
The European Union recognizes the Arctic Council as the primary body for 
circumpolar regional cooperation,97 and it has been trying to achieve the observer 
status in the AC for a while now, so far unsuccessfully. It is also an advocate for 
an overarching international treaty on Arctic matters.98 
Apart from the Integrated policy for the Arctic Region, the EU participates 
in the Northern Dimension Policy (initiated in 1999 and renewed in 2006) 
alongside the Russian Federation, Norway and Iceland. As other participants are 
listed the BEAC, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the NCM and the 
Arctic Council.99 The policy’s aim is “supporting stability, well-being and 
                                                 
93 European Commission. (2012, Jun 26). Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: 
progress since 2008 and next steps. p. 6-12 
94 European Union External Action. (2016, Jun 15). EU Arctic Policy. 
95 Vid. European Commission. (2016, Apr 27). An integrated European…, op. cit., p. 13 
96 Vid. Ibid., 4 
97 Vid. Council of the European Union. (2014, May 12). Council conclusions on developing a European 
Union Policy towards the Arctic Region. p. 2 
98 Vid. Albert Ferrero, J. (2011, Nov). Incidencia del Deshielo…, op. cit., p. 688; also Vid. Ebinger, C. K., 
& Zambetakis, E. (2009, Nov). The geopolitics of Arctic…, op. cit., p. 1231 
99 Vid. The Northern Dimension website: About ND. < http://www.northerndimension.info/northern-
dimension> 
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sustainable development in the region by means of practical cooperation”.100 This 
policy works through four different partnerships that cover the areas of 
environment, public health and social well-being, transport and logistics, and 
culture.101  
 
8.2.3. Environmental Organizations: Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund 
Greenpeace is “an independent global campaigning organization that acts 
to change attitudes and behavior, to protect and conserve the environment and to 
promote peace”,102 according to its own definition. Protection of all forms of 
biodiversity and prevention of oceans’ pollution are included in its core values103, 
which are also applicable in the Arctic.  
Greenpeace has been working for the benefit of the Arctic through their 
program Save the Arctic since 2012 and it encourages people to take part in 
prohibiting oil and gas industry in the Arctic waters altogether. The basic idea 
behind this claim is the fact that in the case of an oil spill, the ecological impact 
would be devastating for the fragile Arctic environment and ecosystems, since 
there are currently no truly efficient methods for recovering the spilled oil.104  
In addition, Greenpeace is a true advocate for the creation of an Arctic 
Sanctuary. It is a proposal for creating a 2.8 million km2 marine protected area 
(MPA) in the high seas of the Arctic Ocean (with the total size of 14 million km2), 
which in turn shall contribute to the CBD’s agreement of establishing networks of 
MPA.105 The Sanctuary would lie entirely beyond the 200 nautical mile limit of 
the EEZ of the coastal states,106 thus not affecting the state jurisdiction (this is 
illustrated later on in figure 8). However, since activities such as fishing, military 
activity and exploration or extraction of hydrocarbons or other minerals from the 
                                                 
100 Ibid. 
101 Vid. Ibid.  
102 Greenpeace. (2014, Jun). Arctic Sanctuary., p. 16 
103 Vid. Greenpeace website: About Us > Our Core Values. <http://www.greenpeace.org/ 
international/en/about/our-core-values/> 
104 Vid. Greenpeace website: The dangers of Arctic Oil. <http://www.greenpeace.org/ 
international/en/campaigns/climate-change/arctic-impacts/The-dangers-of-Arctic-oil/> 
105 Vid. Greenpeace. (2014, Jun). Arctic Sanctuary., op. cit., p. 4-5 
106 Vid. Ibid., p. 4 
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seabed would be banned completely,107 it could interfere with the continental shelf 
delimitation claims (extending possibly up to 350 nautical miles). This non-
governmental organization (NGO) also states that the establishment of this 
Sanctuary is not solely the responsibility of the Arctic Five, but since the area in 
question lies beyond national jurisdictions, it is a matter of the entire international 
community.108 
As a circumpolar environmental NGO with an observer status in the AC, 
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has had a Global Arctic Program (GAP) for the 
region’s benefit since 1992.109 Its main goals are preserving the Arctic's rich 
biodiversity, ensuring the sustainable use of renewable natural resources and 
reducing pollution and wasteful consumption in general.110  
WWF advocates, quite obviously, for the general environmental protection 
of the Arctic above all. Nevertheless, it recognizes that the Arctic can’t become 
just a natural reserve, since its inhabitants need economic opportunities to make a 
good living. For this reason, the development that WWF promotes should happen 
at a pace and on a scale that can be sustained by the Arctic ecosystems.111 As its 
vision, WWF states an “effective international stewardship to shield the Arctic 
from the worst effects of rapid change, by promoting healthy living systems to the 
benefit of local peoples and all humanity”.112 
Furthermore, WWF cooperates on three different levels: with governments 
(bilaterally and through the AC), private businesses and people. It has also created 
some specifically oriented projects towards oil and gas industry and shipping. The 
organization seems to consider shipping to be more acceptable and less hazardous 
than oil and gas industry, although it demands for more security and technological 
advances on both sectors.113 
                                                 
107 Vid. Ibid., p. 5 
108 Vid. Ibid., p. 10 
109 Vid. WWF website: Our Solutions. <http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/arctic/ 
what_we _do/> 
110 Vid. Ibid. 
111 Vid. WWF. (n.d.). WWF Global Arctic Program Factsheet. p. 4 
112 WWF website: Our Solutions. op. cit.  
113 Vid. WWF website: Arctic Oil and Gas. < http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/ 
arctic/what_we_do/oil_gas/>; also Shipping in the Arctic. < http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_ 
work/arctic/what_we_do/shipping/> 
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8.2.4. Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations 
There are three major indigenous peoples’ forums of cooperation: the Inuit 
in North America, Greenland and Chukotka (Russia) have formed the 
multinational non-governmental organization Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC, 
1977), the Saami people in Fennoscandia have created their multinational NGO 
called the Saami Council (SC, 1956) and the Russian indigenous groups have 
founded the national umbrella organization called the Russian Association of 
Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East (RAIPON, 1990).  
All three supported the Arctic Council’s creation in 1996 and became 
permanent participants with the rights of active participation and full consultation, 
a unique status for indigenous communities in global terms.114 (As mentioned 
before, there are also three other indigenous groups as permanent participants in 
the AC: Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in 
Council International). However, there isn’t yet an explicitly and formally 
established Arctic Agenda by any of these organizations.115 
Nowadays many of the indigenous peoples live as minorities in their nation-
states, and thus define themselves as nations within or across nations, generating 
a global trend to treat them as international actors116 (even though the three forums 
aren’t formal international organizations). Additionally, most of the indigenous 
communities are also divided by national borders, as can be illustrated by figure 
3. Nevertheless, they define themselves as nations and the Arctic as their 
homeland, with little regard to the national borders.117  
                                                 
114 Vid. Heininen, L. (2011). Post-Cold War Arctic…, op. cit., p. 100 
115 Vid. Ibid., p. 102 
116 Vid. Ibid., p. 99 
117 Vid. Ibid., p. 102  
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Figure 3. Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ organizations118 
 
The ICC has four principal goals, as follows: “strengthen unity among Inuit 
of the circumpolar region; promote Inuit rights and interests on an international 
level; develop and encourage long-term policies that safeguard the Arctic 
environment; and seek full and active partnership in the political, economic, and 
social development of circumpolar regions”.119  
                                                 
118 News Deeply. Arctic Deeply: Indigenous peoples and cultures.  
119 ICC website: About ICC. <http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/> 
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The Saami Council states its primary interest to be promoting the rights and 
interests of Saami people in the four countries they live in.  Other main tasks 
would include obtaining recognition for the Saami people as a nation and 
maintaining the cultural, political, economic and social rights they possess.120  
RAIPON as well establishes four main areas of action: protection of 
indigenous peoples’ human rights, defense of their legal interests, assistance in 
solving environmental, social, economic, cultural and educational issues, and 
promotion of their right to self-governance.121 
Regardless of the special status the indigenous people have acquired in the 
AC, Denmark and Norway are the only Arctic Countries to have ratified the 
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Convention number 169 on Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples (1989).122 This and the fact that the indigenous peoples’ 
organizations don’t have official game plans for the Arctic geopolitics reasserts 
the indigenous communities’ current secondary role in decision-making 
processes.   
                                                 
120 Vid. SC website: About the Saami Council. < http://www.saamicouncil.net/en/about-saami-council/> 
121 Vid. AC website: Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North. <http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/raipon> 
122 Vid. ILO website: Ratifications of C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention. < 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312
314> 
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9. Issues in the Arctic Debate 
9.1. Natural Resources  
One of the main points of interest of the Arctic seems to be the natural 
resources it harbors in its territory. It is due to the Arctic icecap thaw that the natural 
resources are becoming more and more accessible, although their exploration and 
exploitation is still complicated and expensive.123 The Arctic energy resources have 
tremendous potential, but technological factors can actually be a barrier in the short 
term but an enabler in the long term, since with the current technology the 
exploitation isn’t profitable.124 Evidently, a drop in the oil prices would further lessen 
the states’ interest in the Arctic resources.125  
There is no clear consensus on the exact amount of undiscovered oil and gas 
reserves of the Arctic, although generally it is estimated by the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) at around 22%, 18% of oil and 30% of natural gas.126 
Currently almost all the known resources can be found within national jurisdiction, 
as evidenced by figure 4, and thus free from border conflicts. Natural gas hydrates 
(NGH), widely spread in permafrost127 regions and on deep sea continental slopes, 
could become a viable option for exploitation somewhere in the future, but for now 
it requires more investigation on both extraction and production.128  
In general terms, the Arctic is a very challenging environment for developing 
energy projects, due to various reasons:129 the climate conditions are harsh with ice 
covered land and sea, high winds and extreme cold, operating seasons can be shorter 
and special equipment may be required, thus elevating the costs. On the other hand, 
the lack of infrastructure such as roads, ports or pipelines poses its own challenges, 
making transport difficult and expensive, given that distances are usually rather long 
and the weather may affect transport timelines as well. In environmental terms, the 
                                                 
123 Vid. Buchanan, E. (2016, Jan 21). Arctic Thaw. Foreign Affairs. 
124 Vid. Ebinger, C. K., & Zambetakis, E. (2009, Nov). The geopolitics of Arctic…, op. cit., p. 1217 
125 Vid. Buchanan, E. (2016, Jan 21). Arctic Thaw., op. cit.  
126 Vid. Ibid. 
127 Permafrost is defined as “ground (soil or rock and included ice or organic material) that remains at or 
below 0°C for at least two consecutive years”. It can also occur subsea, as on the continental shelves 
bordering the Arctic Ocean. (International Permafrost Association website: What is permafrost? < 
http://ipa.arcticportal.org/publications/occasional-publications/what-is-permafrost>)  
128 Vid. Beauregard-Tellier, F. (2008, Oct 24). The Arctic: Hydrocarbon resources., p. 4 
129 Vid. Ibid., p. 4-5 
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ecosystems of the Arctic are delicate and very easily disturbed by oil and gas 
activities. Lastly, even though thanks to global warming the oceanic icecap is melting, 
thus facilitating the access to underwater resources, on dry land the permafrost 
melting, which complicates the realization of the much needed terrestrial 
infrastructure projects considerably. If the tundra keeps melting it can pose problems 
for the construction of natural gas pipelines, giving more importance to liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) and seaborne transportation.130 
 
Figure 4. Fossil fuel resources and oil and gas production in the Arctic131 
                                                 
130 Vid. Ebinger, C. K., & Zambetakis, E. (2009, Nov). The geopolitics of Arctic…, op. cit., p. 1218 
131 GRID-Arendal. (2006). Fossil fuel resources and oil and gas production in the Arctic. 
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The Arctic is the source of 10% of the world’s oil production and 25% of the 
world’s gas production, with Russia as the main producer (80% of oil and 99% of gas 
production).132 Russia’s main interest seems to reside in the natural resources, but the 
claim of Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges as an extension of its continental shelf 
doesn’t favor this line of thought, since neither of the areas present very promising 
reserves.133 But, as Russia’s national Arctic strategy confirmed, the Arctic’s strategic 
and extremely important role as a resource base is vital to Russian sovereign 
interests.134 Nevertheless, as much as Russia emphasizes the importance of the energy 
sector, currently it lacks the technological skill necessary for Arctic exploration and 
exploitation.135  
As for the Asian countries, China and India’s interest is mostly due to their 
rising energy needs in the future, whereas Japan for example depends almost entirely 
on imported energy,136 which makes energy security a key issue for the country. 
Additionally, China has great interest in Greenland for its vast deposits of rare-earth 
minerals, many of them required in the production of high technology, a market 
currently monopolized by China137 (Greenland, on the other hand, wishes to use its 
mineral resources to further its independence from Denmark, i.e. to become 
economically self-sufficient).138 As for the Chinese-Russian relations, an energetic 
agreement was signed in 2014.139 China is prepared to invest in oil and gas 
exploration and extraction in Siberia,140 and could as well try to obtain concessions 
in exchange for building infrastructure in the region.141 In any case, China has the 
funds for solo Arctic extraction but not sufficient technological knowledge, whereas 
Russia lacks both, thus requiring cooperation with Western partners.142 
                                                 
132 Vid. Beauregard-Tellier, F. (2008, Oct 24). The Arctic…, op. cit., p. 1 
133 Vid. Baev, P. (2007, Oct). Russia's Race for the Arctic and the New Geopolitics of the North Pole. p. 6 
134 Vid. Dodds, K. (2010, Oct). A Polar Mediterranean?..., op. cit., p. 308 
135 Vid. Buchanan, E. (2016, Jan 21). Arctic Thaw., op. cit.  
136 Vid. Liow, J. C. (2014, Jun 21). Arctic Summer., op. cit. 
137 Vid. Palacián de Inza, B., & Sánchez, I. G. (2013, Jul/Aug). Geopolítica del deshielo en el Ártico. 
138 Vid. Ibid. 
139 Vid. Alexeeva, O., & Lasserre, F. (2014). La Chine en Arctique: genèse et évolution d'une politique. In 
M. Foucher, L'Arctique: la nouvelle frontière (pp. 111-128). Paris: CNRS Éditions. p. 112 
140 Vid. Palacián de Inza, B., & Sánchez, I. G. (2013, Jul/Aug). Geopolítica del deshielo…, op. cit.  
141 Vid. Gómez de Ágreda, Á. (2014, Mar). Climate Change in the Arctic: Beyond the North Pole. Spanish 
Institute of Strategic Studies, 3. p. 13 
142 Vid. Jakobson, L. (2010, Mar). China prepares for an ice-free Arctic. Sipri Insights on Peace and 
Security, 2010/2. p. 8 
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To some extent the Arctic exploration has already started. For example, there 
are two major energy projects in the region: the Yamal LNG project and the 
Shtokman gas condensate field project. The Yamal LNG project, situated on the 
Yamal Peninsula, is a partnership among Total, Novatek, China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) and Silk Road Fund. It was launched in 2013 and is set to start 
in 2017. As for logistics, an airport and a port were built specifically for this project, 
with envisioned maritime transport routes in summer towards Asia and in winter 
towards Europe.143 In turn, the Shtokman gas condensate field project in the Barents 
Sea is a partnership among Gazprom, Statoil Hydro and Total. The aim is to make 
the field “a resource base for deliveries of Russian gas - both pipeline and LNG - to 
markets of the Atlantic basin”.144 After some initial rescheduling, the pipeline gas 
production should have started in 2016 and the LNG production in 2017,145 but in the 
end the field won’t start functioning before 2025.146 
 
9.2. Maritime Routes 
There are currently two maritime routes opening up for transit in the Arctic: 
the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which can be seen 
in figure 5. In addition, the possibility of an even more direct route through the central 
Arctic Ocean and North Pole (also visible in figure 5) may be plausible someday 
further in the future.147 At the moment navigation is possible only during the summer 
months and for now the routes won’t be able to play a bigger role due to the lack of 
light, the harsh climate and the danger in case of an accident and need of rescue.148  
                                                 
143 Vid. Total website. (n.d.). Yamal LNG: The gas that came in from the cold. 
144 Statoil website. (2008). Gazprom, Total and StatoilHydro create Shtokman company. 
145 OGJ Editors. (2010, Aug 2). Shtokman partners delay production start. Oil and Gas Journal. 
146 Lossan, A. (2016, Jun 23). Gazprom postpones offshore gas production: Will prices rise in Europe? 
Russia beyond the headlines. 
147 Vid. Pancracio, J.-P. (2014). La navigation en Arctique. In M. Foucher, L'Arctique: la nouvelle frontière 
(pp. 91-109). Paris: CNRS Éditions. p. 91 
148 Moltó, Á. (2011, Mar 10). El Ártico y la política exterior de Canadá. Estudios de Política Exterior. 
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Figure 5. The Arctic sea routes149 
 
It is due to climate change and the melting of sea ice in the Arctic that has 
made these navigational developments possible in the first place. The Arctic sea ice 
is made of two types of ice: the superficial one-year ice cover that melts entirely every 
summer and the multi-year ice cover that does not melt in summer.150 However, even 
if the conditions in the Arctic are changing, nothing is certain and the region still 
continues to pose a wide scenario of general what ifs. In general, technological 
advancements constitute one of the key factors for the Arctic shipping, since for now 
ice-breakers are a necessity and they also cost more to build and burn more fuel. Even 
though the new shipping routes will shorten the distance between Europe and Asia, 
they can still be more dangerous due to the changing climate and ice conditions.151 
On another note, given that both NWP and NSR (as well as the Central Arctic Route) 
would need to use the Bering Strait for navigation in both directions, it could create 
a major chokepoint in the future, thus complicating the international shipping through 
the Arctic.152  
                                                 
149 Ryall, J. (2013, Jun 28). Deutsche Welle. 
150 Vid. Pancracio, J.-P. (2014). La navigation en…, op. cit., p. 94 
151 Vid. Ebinger, C. K., & Zambetakis, E. (2009, Nov). The geopolitics of Arctic…, op. cit., p. 1222 
152 Vid. Albert Ferrero, J. (2011, Nov). Incidencia del Deshielo…, op. cit., p.683 
Geopolitics of the Arctic: Challenges and Prospects 
42 
 
The Northern Sea Route has been open for navigation during approximately 4 
months a year153 since roughly 2007,154 with little transit in comparison to the world 
trade, but with an increasing trend: 46 ships in 2012; 296 ships in 2013.155 It is 
approximately 7000km shorter than the route through the Suez Canal, a natural 
chokepoint in the trajectory located in a politically possibly instable region.156 The 
NSR will benefit above all the commercial exchange between Europe and Asia, 
notably China and Japan, given the current maritime shipping trends that can be seen 
in figure 6. However, it cannot be considered to be a game changer for the 
international trade (at least not yet) since the weather continues to be unpredictable, 
causing delays, and the lack of infrastructure along the way being too pronounced.157  
 
Figure 6. A Year of Global Shipping Routes Mapped by GPS158  
 
Nevertheless, should the NSR be developed, Russia would greatly benefit from 
it in the long run, since it would require for development of necessary shipping 
infrastructure, thus invigorating the northern parts of Russia, especially Siberia. The 
installation of new ports and a commercial shipping route would also require better 
access in terms of transportation infrastructure from and towards the interior of the 
                                                 
153 Vid. Ibid., 97 
154 Vid. Dodds, K. (2010, Oct). A Polar Mediterranean?..., op. cit., p. 304 
155 Vid. Pancracio, J.-P. (2014). La navigation en…, op. cit., p. 97 
156 Vid. Reinoso, J. (2013, Aug 12). El cambio climático abre una nueva ruta comercial para China. El País. 
157 Vid. Liow, J. C. (2014, Jun 21). Arctic Summer., op. cit. 
158 Ghose, T. (2010, Jan 25). A Year of Global Shipping Routes Mapped by GPS. Wired. 
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country and continent, which could mean harnessing the great Russian rivers such as 
the Lena or the Yenisei.159 This in turn could offer more urban and industrial 
development in the Siberian region, since at the moment the vast majority of Siberia 
remains practically uncommunicated.160 
The Northwest Passage is as well approximately 7000km shorter than the route 
through the Panama Canal (which is currently in expansion), but the sea ice variation 
continues to be problematic in the Arctic region, as well as the lack of general 
infrastructure, such as ports for cargo.161 The NWP has actually two possible 
navigational routes through the Canadian archipelago, the northern and the southern 
path.162 In addition, the Passage is basically made entirely out of narrows and straits, 
a detail adding to the complex development of the NWP because Canada considers 
these narrows and straits in its archipelago to be its internal waters, a claim the US 
opposes since it would limit the freedom of navigation and imply tariffs and controls 
by the Canadian authorities.163 Once this difference of opinion has been cleared, the 
US and Canada should operate conjointly in the management of the NWP, as they 
have proved with the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to 
be perfectly capable of working together.164 Furthermore, the US failure to ratify 
UNCLOS could actually hinder its role in the negotiations in the Arctic region in 
general, and it doesn’t improve its case in this regard either.165 
Furthermore, both Canada and Russia consider that the navigation alongside 
their coasts should be subject to authorization. At first glance this would seem to be 
against the international law on maritime navigation (given the freedom of an 
innocent passage through another country’s EEZ), but UNCLOS also establishes a 
particular Arctic clause in article 234: “Coastal States have the right to adopt and 
enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and 
control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the 
exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the 
                                                 
159 Vid. Gómez de Ágreda, Á. (2014, Mar). Climate Change in the…, op. cit., p. 5 
160 Vid. Ibid., p. 12 
161 Vid. Christopher, J., & Fast, E. (2008, Oct 24). The Arctic: Transportation, infrastructure and 
communication. p. 2 
162 Vid. Pancracio, J.-P. (2014). La navigation en…, op. cit., p. 99 
163 Vid. Albert Ferrero, J. (2011, Nov). Incidencia del Deshielo…, op. cit., p. 687 
164 Vid. Borgerson, S. G. (2008). Arctic…, op.cit. 
165 Vid. Borgerson, S. G. (2013). The Coming…, op. cit. 
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presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or 
exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could 
cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws 
and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific 
evidence”.166 This article, with a clear purpose to protect the environment, could offer 
some foundation for Canada’s claim for control on its archipelagic waters, but in the 
end it will not be enough to justify subjecting an international strait to national 
jurisdiction.167 
In order to respond to the increasing viability of the Arctic transportation, the 
Arctic Council issued the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) in 2009 and 
the IMO published the Polar Code in 2014 (expected to enter into force in January 
2017)168. The AMSA’s “central focus is on ships: their uses of the Arctic Ocean, their 
potential impacts on humans and the Arctic marine environment and their marine 
infrastructure requirements”.169 The report doesn’t consider determining the 
operational and economic viability of the Arctic routes as its focal point.170 It does 
contain recommendations on where future efforts should be appointed to and also 
calls for mandatory regulations on ship construction standards.171 The IMO’s Polar 
Code is an international treaty that regulates “ship design, construction and 
equipment; operational and training concerns; search and rescue; and, equally 
important, the protection of the unique environment and eco-systems of the polar 
regions”.172 Both of these developments show the existing interest in the maritime 
routes, but without leaving the environmental protection in a secondary role.  
As stated before, the Asian countries as well have a high interest in the Arctic 
shipping routes, as can be evidenced also by China’s actions in Iceland: it wishes to 
use Iceland as a gateway to the Arctic action, by means of establishing a naval port 
                                                 
166 United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention…, op. cit., p. 116 
167 Vid. Pancracio, J.-P. (2014). La navigation en…, op. cit., p. 104-105 
168 Vid. IMO website: Shipping in polar waters. < http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/hottopics/ 
polar/pages/default.aspx> 
169 Arctic Council. (2009). Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment. p. 2 
170 Vid. Ibid., p. 2-3 
171 Vid. Ebinger, C. K., & Zambetakis, E. (2009, Nov). The geopolitics of Arctic…, op. cit., p. 1227 
172 IMO website: Shipping in polar waters. op. cit.  
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and base there.173 Furthermore, the Chinese signed a free-trade agreement with 
Iceland in 2013, its first one with a European country.174 Given that China’s economy 
relies on foreign trade and almost half of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) is 
believed to depend on shipping, the shorter shipping routes would create a substantial 
commercial impact on the country’s economy.175 In addition, the use of NSR would 
induce more development in China’s northeastern coastal areas and ports, although 
on the other hand it would also to some extent reduce importance from the southern 
port facilities.176 True to the traditional Chinese policy of not specifying its strategies 
or objectives in too much detail in an official governmental document (so as to not 
restrict the scope of future action), the Chinese government explains its interests in 
very general terms, stating the environmental issues as its main concerns regarding 
the Arctic region.177 In any case, China wishes to be taken into account and heard in 
regional Arctic governance in the future, since it is a major global player in the 
international dimension.178 
To sum up the positive aspects of the Arctic shipping routes would include: a 
shorter waterway and consecutive savings in time and fuel; less pressure for the 
current chokepoints (such as the Strait of Malacca, or the Suez and Panama Canals, 
also visible in figure 6) and development in infrastructure of remote and 
underdeveloped regions. The negative aspects in turn would include: perilous routes 
due to climate and ice conditions, remoteness for rescue operations in case of an 
accident, too shallow and narrow waterways at some points for big cargo ships and 
the potential environmental risks. 
 
9.3. Environmental Protection  
The Arctic’s nature and ecosystems are very fragile and vulnerable and in dire 
need of protection, given that the Arctic is a central node for the network of ecological 
                                                 
173 Vid. Borgerson, S. G. (2013). The Coming…, op. cit. 
174 Vid. Palacián de Inza, B., & Sánchez, I. G. (2013, Jul/Aug). Geopolítica del deshielo…, op. cit.  
175 Vid. Jakobson, L. (2010, Mar). China prepares for…, op. cit., p. 5 
176 Vid. Ibid., p. 6 
177 Vid. Alexeeva, O., & Lasserre, F. (2014). La Chine en Arctique: genèse…, op.cit. p. 121-123 
178 Vid. Ibid., p. 126 
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interactions of the entire planet.179 It is precisely in the Arctic where climate change’s 
effects are felt the most, and it is also precisely due to these climatic alterations that 
the Arctic has gained in importance, possibly for the detriment of the environment.  
Even though there has always been some oscillation in the amount of ice and 
other climatic conditions of the planet,180 the data we have now shows for example 
that the amount of multi-year ice has diminished181 and the level of thaw predicted 
for 2080 was reached in 2012.182 The loss of sea ice coverage can be seen in figure 
7, and given the downward trend, it doesn’t seem to be due to natural oscillations. 
The Arctic is comprised of three major biomes: the polar desert in the areas closest 
to the North Pole, the tundra as the next segment and the boreal forest (or taiga in 
Eurasia) in the southern parts of the Arctic region.183 Due to climate change, the 
biomes move towards north, obliging first the animals to move along with the 
receding icecap (vital for their survival) and then the Inuit hunters after them.184   
                                                 
179 Vid. Peris Martínez, M. B. (2014, May). Impactos en el Ártico y sus repercusiones. Ojeando la Agenda, 
29. p. 9 
180 Vid. Albert Ferrero, J. (2011, Nov). Incidencia del Deshielo…, op. cit., p. 681 
181 Vid. Ebinger, C. K., & Zambetakis, E. (2009, Nov). The geopolitics of Arctic…, op. cit., p. 1216 
182 Vid. Peris Martínez, M. B. (2014, May). Impactos en el Ártico…, op. cit., p. 9 
183 Vid. Maré, C. (2014). Réchauffement climatique en Arctique: la fin de l'Age de glace. In M. Foucher, 
L'Arctique: la nouvelle frontière (pp. 147-163). Paris: CNRS Éditions. p. 154-155 
184 Vid. Ibid., p. 159 
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Figure 7. Sea ice cover for the annual minimum in September, the minimum extent during each 
period185 
 
There are three types of ice thaw occurring in the Arctic: the melting of the 
permafrost (fresh water), the melting of the sea ice that covers the Arctic Ocean (salt 
water) and the melting that originates from the big Siberian rivers.186 Traditionally 
the rise of sea levels is associated with the thaw of the Arctic sea ice and icebergs, 
but this isn’t actually accurate according to Archimedes’ principle: the volume of the 
sea ice is the same whether it’s in solid or liquid form. The rise of the sea levels, 
however, could be urged on by the melting of the glaciers of Alaska, but above all it 
is due to the dilatation of the water mass as a consequence of its warming.187 
Global warming is responsible for the Arctic thaw, but given the Arctic’s icy 
nature, the problem is even more complicated due to for example the ice albedo 
feedback loop: snow and ice have high reflectivity, which keeps the planet and the 
ocean cooler, but when due to global warming the sea ice melts and reveals beneath 
                                                 
185 Fetterer, F. (2016, Aug 11). Carbon Brief 
186 Vid. Albert Ferrero, J. (2011, Nov). Incidencia del Deshielo…, op. cit., p. 681 
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it the darker water masses with little reflectivity, it further warms the ocean and the 
climate in general.188 The same effect is caused by the darkening of the tundra due to 
airborne pollution form southern industrial activities.189 This creates a snowball effect 
in the Arctic: as it gets warmer the snow melts faster, and the more the snow melts, 
the warmer it gets. Thus the Arctic becomes not only a suffering party to climate 
change but also a contributor to it.190  
Furthermore, the rising water temperatures are changing sea ice distribution 
with grave impacts on ice-dependent fauna, which in turn (combined with the loss of 
permafrost) could impact the native peoples of the region very negatively.191 These 
local communities prefer emphasizing the natural environment and developing their 
communities on its conditions rather than the industrial point of view of simply 
seeking for the most profit.192 The primary sources for local pollution are the northern 
mining and metal industries and military activities, with problems related even to 
radioactivity.193 It is known that Russia has dumped nuclear reactors, some still 
loaded with nuclear fuel, into the Arctic Ocean between the years 1958-1992 and 
these residues still  haven’t been completely cleaned up.194 However, a key factor for 
the Arctic’s management is striking a balance between protecting the environment 
and still making the region a major driver for economic growth, thus creating a true 
sustainable development and exploitation scenario.195 
It is important to establish limits to shipping as well as oil and gas industries’ 
development in the region, in benefit for the environment. WWF is working towards 
protecting areas of critical habitat, including crucial movement corridors and denning 
places, in order to prevent and mitigate threats from the industrial development.196 
WWF has already identified three areas that should stay permanently off-limits to oil 
exploitation: Norway’s Lofoten and Vesterålen islands; West Russia’s Kamchatka 
                                                 
188 Vid. Pancracio, J.-P. (2014). La navigation en…, op. cit., p. 94 
189 Vid. Prime Minister's Office. (2013, Sep 6). Suomen Arktinen…, op. cit., p. 35 
190 Vid. Maré, C. (2014). Réchauffement climatique en…, op. cit., p. 151 
191 Vid. Ebinger, C. K., & Zambetakis, E. (2009, Nov). The geopolitics of Arctic…, op. cit., p. 1215 
192 Vid. Kuersten, A. (2015, Aug 20). The Arctic Race…, op. cit. 
193 Vid. Prime Minister's Office. (2013, Sep 6). Suomen Arktinen…, op. cit., p. 35 
194 Vid. Borgerson, S. G. (2008). Arctic…, op.cit. 
195 Vid. Borgerson, S. G. (2013). The Coming…, op. cit. 
196 Vid. WWF. (n.d.). WWF Global Arctic Program Factsheet., p. 4 
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Shelf; and Alaska’s Bristol Bay, the protection of which  was announced in December 
2014.197 
Greenpeace in turn, would ban the Arctic exploration and exploitation of 
hydrocarbons completely, and not without reason, since oil spills are much harder to 
clean up in cold and icy conditions.198 Few of Greenpeace’s compelling arguments 
include for example the data from two major oil spill accidents: the Exxon Valdez 
and Deepwater Horizon. In 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker spilled 11 million 
gallons (approximately 41 million liters) of oil into Alaska’s Prince William Sound 
and then spent $2 billion trying to clean it up, only recovering 7% of the total amount 
of the spilled oil. In turn, the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig spilled up to 
200 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, cleaning up only 8% of 
the oil199 which in this case wasn’t even located in the more challenging northern 
conditions.  
In addition to these arguments, Greenpeace is an advocate for the creation of 
an Arctic Sanctuary in the high seas of the Arctic Ocean, seen in figure 8, where there 
aren’t any protected areas. The Sanctuary is deemed necessary because “the Arctic 
Ocean is one of the planet’s few remaining pristine marine regions and it is 
particularly vulnerable to human impacts”.200 Inside this 2.8 million km2 area 
covering the remote high seas of the Arctic Ocean, all extractive or destructive uses 
would be entirely prohibited.201 
                                                 
197 Vid. WWF website: Arctic Oil and Gas. op. cit. 
198 Vid. Ebinger, C. K., & Zambetakis, E. (2009, Nov). The geopolitics of Arctic…, op. cit., p. 1223 
199 Vid. Greenpeace website: Arctic Oil Drilling. < http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/arctic/issues/oil-
drilling/> 
200 Greenpeace. (2014, Jun). Arctic Sanctuary., op.cit., p. 7 
201 Vid. Ibid., p. 5 
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Figure 8. The proposed Arctic Sanctuary in between the EEZ of the coastal states (inside the marked 
200-mile line)202 
 
In order to protect the Arctic, there are three major points to make: it is essential 
to understand and preserve the biodiversity better; sustainable development must be 
largely promoted; and finally, the effects of climate change should be limited.203 As 
for the Paris Agreement (2015), the latest major environmental treaty, it doesn’t 
contain any mention of the Arctic.204 Nevertheless, it would seem that the 
environmental aspects have gained so much importance in the recent years that they 
will be taken into account in all other areas of action in the future. 
  
                                                 
202 Sala, E. (2011, May 19). National Geographic. 
203 Vid. Maré, C. (2014). Réchauffement climatique en…, op. cit., p. 162 
204 Vid. Quinn, E. (2015, Dec 18). Arctic missing from Paris climate agreement. 
Geopolitics of the Arctic: Challenges and Prospects 
51 
 
10. Conclusions 
In today’s globalized and cooperative world, a theory concerning world 
domination seems to be rather inadequate. Nevertheless, every period tends to have a 
more or less influential hegemonic power, which at the moment would be the United 
States of America, even if it can’t be considered as an explicit world ruler. Mahan and 
Mackinder’s geopolitical theories were formulated at a different time and thus could not 
be directly applicable today. However, if we took, for example, the Heartland theory and 
applied it to a different region, e.g. the Arctic, with different parameters that are crucial 
for a nation’s prosperity today (such as demographic and economic strength, a stable and 
functioning state structure as well as logistics and technology), the core idea of a dominant 
power could theoretically still be valid.  
The Arctic particularly has gained a lot of importance due to the effects of climate 
change and the possibilities that arise with it. In the end though, it will be the states and 
their national interests that will finally determine the Arctic’s future, i.e. the geopolitical 
importance of the region including its natural resources and environment, because the 
non-state actors still hold only a secondary status in any given negotiations and decisions, 
although the Arctic strategies seem to set a trend of further inclusion in the future. 
When it comes to Arctic cooperation, the big question still lies with the exclusive 
Arctic Five group and their course of action. If they persist on their quest of exclusive 
Arctic decision-making, it will undermine the Arctic Council’s influence and importance, 
as well as drive a wedge between the Arctic Five and the rest of the world (the Arctic 
countries, non-Arctic states as well as non-state actors). Given that every possible 
scenario for the future of the Arctic will have global impacts (whether its climate change 
mitigation and environmental protection, commercial shipping or energy production), a 
more inclusive cooperation should be heeded instead of limiting it to a small group.  
The matter of the Arctic legal regime is also of great importance. The law of the 
sea lies in its core, and even if at the moment UNCLOS can’t be applied to the US, it is 
bound by the customary international law. In addition, more legal documents have been 
issued concerning different sectors of interest in the Arctic (e.g. the IMO’s Polar Code 
concerning shipping), but there is no overarching treaty in the region. The existing treaties 
and agreements are well on their way of being respected, whereas the creation of an 
overarching treaty would not only take a lot of time and negotiation, but it would also 
require a higher commitment from the states at once. An overarching treaty could 
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nonetheless be a viable and functioning option, as is proven by the Antarctic Treaty, if 
the international community decided to create one. However, the Arctic’s situation is 
different from the Antarctic, not only due to its geological dissimilarity (the Arctic has no 
land whereas Antarctica is a continent), but also due to its strategic location as closely 
surrounded by sovereign states and their continental shelves and EEZ. This generates 
more interest from the states to delimit their corresponding sections and leaves less space 
for an actual Arctic to be considered as common heritage of mankind.  
Ultimately, if the Arctic is to evolve into a geopolitical game changer in the future, 
many different factors will need to coincide. First and foremost, the sea ice thaw is 
necessary for any commercial activity to be possible in the region, whether it’s related to 
energy or shipping. But this alone won’t be enough, since for example in order for the 
exploration and exploitation of Arctic’s natural resources to become profitable, either 
significant advances in technology or a notable rise in hydrocarbon prices are imperative. 
On the other hand, if the sea ice keeps thawing and the shipping routes could be 
developed, the NSR for example would greatly benefit Russia and its northern parts’ 
development, as well as the Euro-Asian trade sector and giants like China. However, the 
sea ice thaw has also its negative impact on the Arctic ecosystems as well as the entire 
planet’s climate, creating more need for environmental protection, which is becoming an 
ever more poignant issue in the global international relations due to natural phenomena 
and disasters that receive more media attention and raise awareness and protective 
attitudes all over the world.  
All in all, a complete win-win situation regarding the Arctic doesn’t seem to be a 
possibility. If climate change effects could be mitigated and protecting the Arctic waters 
was deemed the most important course of action, shipping through much longer routes 
would continue polluting the oceans more than would be necessary if the shorter Arctic 
routes were available. If the energy sector couldn’t be developed or Arctic exploration 
and exploitation were to be banned altogether, particularly Russia but also Canada, 
Norway and the US, would lose the possibility of benefiting from this entire sector in the 
future. And then again, if both the Arctic shipping and energy sector were to be 
developed, it would have a devastating impact on the region’s and possibly as well on the 
planet’s ecosystems and climate.  
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